hosting
POST /v1/site-events/ingest
Receive a site's report about its own changes (signed webhook).
Authentication
This endpoint is public. It takes no credential and no organisation — it is what our own marketing site and AI answer engines read.
This endpoint takes no organisation id. Your key already identifies the organisation it belongs to, and the response is scoped to it.
Try it
Replace anything in angle brackets with your own values, and the key placeholder with a key from your dashboard.
curl -X POST https://api.zinndigital.com/v1/site-events/ingest \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{ "site": <string> }'Signed in? The API console in your dashboard fills in your real organisation id and your own key, and runs the request against the live API so you can see the actual response. Open this endpoint in the API console
Details
What a site's Zinn® plugin POSTs when something changed on it — a plugin activated or deactivated, core or a theme updated, a theme switched — plus the PHP version it is running. **Machine-to-machine; there is no principal.** WordPress is talking, not a person, so there is no session, no API key and no organisation header. Authentication is an **HMAC-SHA256** over `"<timestamp>\n<body>"` in `X-Zinn-Cache-Signature` (`sha256=<hex>`), with `X-Zinn-Cache-Timestamp` carrying the unix seconds — the same scheme the plugin already uses for its cache-purge mirror. **The secret is derived, never stored.** The engine resolves `site` to a hosted site by primary domain, derives that site's webhook secret from the platform master key, and compares in constant time. The organisation comes from the **resolved site**: a valid signature proves the sender holds that site's secret and proves nothing whatsoever about any other tenant. **Every refusal is uninformative on purpose.** An unknown hostname is a bare `404` and a bad signature a bare `401`, because a chattier answer would tell anyone who can guess a hostname which domains this platform hosts. **Idempotent.** WordPress fires some of these hooks more than once per change and the POST is fire-and-forget, so a duplicate delivery is accepted with `stored: 0` rather than refused — replay safety lives in the database.
Parameters
| Name | Type | Required | What it is |
|---|---|---|---|
X-Zinn-Cache-Timestamp (header) | string | Yes | Unix seconds. Signed as part of the material, which is what makes the replay window meaningful — a signature over the body alone could be replayed for ever with a fresh header. |
X-Zinn-Cache-Signature (header) | string | Yes | `sha256=<hex>`. |
Request body
| Name | Type | Required | What it is |
|---|---|---|---|
site | string | Yes | The site's own `home_url()`. **An untrusted claim** — it selects which site's derived secret the signature is checked against, and nothing more. The organisation is taken from t… |
php_version | string | No | The PHP version the site is running. The engine raises a `php_version_changed` event when it differs from the last one reported — a change is detectable by **comparison** rather… |
events | object[] | No | A batch. WordPress bulk-updating 40 plugins fires one `upgrader_process_complete` describing all of them, so a batch is the normal case, not the edge case. `deploy` is rejected… |
Response
| Name | Type | Required | What it is |
|---|---|---|---|
accepted | boolean | Yes | — |
stored | integer | Yes | How many rows were **new**. A duplicate delivery is accepted with `0` rather than refused: WordPress fires some of these hooks more than once per change and the POST is fire-and… |
Errors this endpoint can return
401 · 404 · 422 · 503