connections

POST /v1/connections/{provider}/{connectionId}/probe

Re-test a stored credential, one row per permission.

All connections endpoints

Authentication

Send an API key as a bearer token. The key must carry the connections.manage permission; a key without it is refused with 403, not 404.

This endpoint takes no organisation id. Your key already identifies the organisation it belongs to, and the response is scoped to it.

Try it

Replace anything in angle brackets with your own values, and the key placeholder with a key from your dashboard.

curl -X POST https://api.zinndigital.com/v1/connections/{provider}/{connectionId}/probe \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer zdk_live_…" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{  }'

Signed in? The API console in your dashboard fills in your real organisation id and your own key, and runs the request against the live API so you can see the actual response. Open this endpoint in the API console

Details

Exercises every permission we need **against the provider** using the credential already stored for this connection, and returns one row per permission. This is the "retest" half of add-and-test: the customer's fix happens in their vendor's console — they tick the missing permission at Cloudflare — so there is nothing to re-paste and the stored credential is used. ⛔ It does not ask the credential to describe itself. A least-privilege token cannot enumerate its own permissions, which is how a token missing DNS edit entirely came to be displayed as "works, we will check on first use". Every check here is a real, well-formed call, and a write permission is proved by writing — a throwaway DNS record created and immediately deleted, or a zone setting written back to the value just read. Each row is `pass`, `fail` or **`unknown`**, and the third is not a nicety: `unknown` is the honest answer when we could not reach the question — no zone on the account yet, the vendor rate-limiting us, or a well-formed request refused on its content. ⛔ A client that renders `unknown` as a tick has reintroduced the defect this endpoint exists to remove. The result is stored against the connection with the time it was taken, and returned with `checked_at`. It is a **measurement, not a state** — the customer can revoke a permission at their vendor a second later and nothing here will know — so any surface showing it must show its age. Requires `connections.manage`.

Parameters

NameTypeRequiredWhat it is
provider (path)ConnectionProviderYesThe third-party provider whose connections are addressed.
connectionId (path)UuidYesThe MCP connection's id.

Request body

NameTypeRequiredWhat it is
zone_hintstringNoThe domain to test the zone-scoped permissions against. Optional — see `ConnectTokenRequest.zone_hint`.

Response

NameTypeRequiredWhat it is
credential_validbooleanYesA statement about the **credential**, not about the permissions. `false` means the provider rejected it outright, in which case the rows are not meaningful and the screen must s…
usablebooleanYesWhether we may store and use this credential: alive, with no **proved** absence of anything required. ⛔ Deliberately not "every row passed" — a brand-new account with no zone on…
checksPermissionCheck[]YesOne row per permission, in a stable catalogue order rather than the order the checks happened to finish in — a checklist whose rows reshuffle between two retests looks broken to…
missingstring[]YesRequired permissions the provider **proved** are absent. Not the unknowns.
unverifiedstring[]YesPermissions we could not determine either way. The honest amber set.
account_refstringYesThe account or zone the provider reported — discovered, never assumed.
detailstringYesAn overall explanation, used mainly for a rejected credential.
checked_atobjectYesWhen this was taken. ⛔ Never render the report without it: a checklist with no date on it is indistinguishable from a live one and will be read as live, when in fact the custome…

Errors this endpoint can return

401 · 403 · 404 · 422 · 429 · 503