connections

POST /v1/connections/{provider}/{connectionId}/probe

Re-test a stored credential, one row per permission.

Semua titik akhir connections

Pengesahan

Hantar kunci API sebagai token pembawa. Kunci tersebut mesti membawa kebenaran connections.manage; kunci yang tidak mempunyainya akan ditolak dengan 403, bukan 404.

Titik akhir ini tidak memerlukan id organisasi. Kunci anda telah mengenal pasti organisasi kepunyaannya, dan respons dis skopkan kepadanya.

Cuba

Gantikan apa sahaja di dalam kurungan sudut dengan nilai anda sendiri, dan pemegang tempat kunci dengan kunci dari papan pemuka anda.

curl -X POST https://api.zinndigital.com/v1/connections/{provider}/{connectionId}/probe \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer zdk_live_…" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{  }'

Sudah log masuk? Konsol API dalam papan pemuka anda mengisi id organisasi sebenar dan kunci anda sendiri, serta menjalankan permintaan terhadap API langsung supaya anda boleh melihat respons sebenar. Buka penamat ini dalam konsol API

Butiran

Exercises every permission we need **against the provider** using the credential already stored for this connection, and returns one row per permission. This is the "retest" half of add-and-test: the customer's fix happens in their vendor's console — they tick the missing permission at Cloudflare — so there is nothing to re-paste and the stored credential is used. ⛔ It does not ask the credential to describe itself. A least-privilege token cannot enumerate its own permissions, which is how a token missing DNS edit entirely came to be displayed as "works, we will check on first use". Every check here is a real, well-formed call, and a write permission is proved by writing — a throwaway DNS record created and immediately deleted, or a zone setting written back to the value just read. Each row is `pass`, `fail` or **`unknown`**, and the third is not a nicety: `unknown` is the honest answer when we could not reach the question — no zone on the account yet, the vendor rate-limiting us, or a well-formed request refused on its content. ⛔ A client that renders `unknown` as a tick has reintroduced the defect this endpoint exists to remove. The result is stored against the connection with the time it was taken, and returned with `checked_at`. It is a **measurement, not a state** — the customer can revoke a permission at their vendor a second later and nothing here will know — so any surface showing it must show its age. Requires `connections.manage`.

Parameter

NamaJenisDiperlukanApakah ia
provider (path)ConnectionProviderYaThe third-party provider whose connections are addressed.
connectionId (path)UuidYaThe MCP connection's id.

Badan permintaan

NamaJenisDiperlukanApakah ia
zone_hintstringTidakThe domain to test the zone-scoped permissions against. Optional — see `ConnectTokenRequest.zone_hint`.

Respons

NamaJenisDiperlukanApakah ia
credential_validbooleanYaA statement about the **credential**, not about the permissions. `false` means the provider rejected it outright, in which case the rows are not meaningful and the screen must s…
usablebooleanYaWhether we may store and use this credential: alive, with no **proved** absence of anything required. ⛔ Deliberately not "every row passed" — a brand-new account with no zone on…
checksPermissionCheck[]YaOne row per permission, in a stable catalogue order rather than the order the checks happened to finish in — a checklist whose rows reshuffle between two retests looks broken to…
missingstring[]YaRequired permissions the provider **proved** are absent. Not the unknowns.
unverifiedstring[]YaPermissions we could not determine either way. The honest amber set.
account_refstringYaThe account or zone the provider reported — discovered, never assumed.
detailstringYaAn overall explanation, used mainly for a rejected credential.
checked_atobjectYaWhen this was taken. ⛔ Never render the report without it: a checklist with no date on it is indistinguishable from a live one and will be read as live, when in fact the custome…

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