connections

POST /v1/connections/{provider}/{connectionId}/probe

Re-test a stored credential, one row per permission.

جميع نقاط نهاية connections

المصادقة

أرسل مفتاح واجهة برمجة التطبيقات (API key) كرمز حامل (bearer token). يجب أن يحمل المفتاح إذن connections.manage؛ والمفتاح الذي لا يملكه يُرفض بالرمز 403 وليس 404.

لا يقبل هذا الطرف أي معرف للمؤسسة. يحدد مفتاحك بالفعل المؤسسة التي ينتمي إليها، وتكون الاستجابة محصورة في نطاقها.

جربه الآن

استبدل أي شيء بين أقواس زاوية بقيمك الخاصة، والعنصر النائب للمفتاح بمفتاح من لوحة تحكمك.

curl -X POST https://api.zinndigital.com/v1/connections/{provider}/{connectionId}/probe \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer zdk_live_…" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{  }'

هل سجلت الدخول؟ تقوم وحدة تحكم واجهة برمجة التطبيقات في لوحة التحكم الخاصة بك بربط معرف مؤسستك الحقيقي ومفتاحك الخاص، وتنفذ الطلب مقابل واجهة برمجة التطبيقات المباشرة لتتمكن من رؤية الاستجابة الفعلية. افتح هذه النهاية الطرفية في وحدة تحكم API

التفاصيل

Exercises every permission we need **against the provider** using the credential already stored for this connection, and returns one row per permission. This is the "retest" half of add-and-test: the customer's fix happens in their vendor's console — they tick the missing permission at Cloudflare — so there is nothing to re-paste and the stored credential is used. ⛔ It does not ask the credential to describe itself. A least-privilege token cannot enumerate its own permissions, which is how a token missing DNS edit entirely came to be displayed as "works, we will check on first use". Every check here is a real, well-formed call, and a write permission is proved by writing — a throwaway DNS record created and immediately deleted, or a zone setting written back to the value just read. Each row is `pass`, `fail` or **`unknown`**, and the third is not a nicety: `unknown` is the honest answer when we could not reach the question — no zone on the account yet, the vendor rate-limiting us, or a well-formed request refused on its content. ⛔ A client that renders `unknown` as a tick has reintroduced the defect this endpoint exists to remove. The result is stored against the connection with the time it was taken, and returned with `checked_at`. It is a **measurement, not a state** — the customer can revoke a permission at their vendor a second later and nothing here will know — so any surface showing it must show its age. Requires `connections.manage`.

المعلمات

الاسمالنوعمطلوبما هو هذا
provider (path)ConnectionProviderنعمThe third-party provider whose connections are addressed.
connectionId (path)UuidنعمThe MCP connection's id.

جسم الطلب

الاسمالنوعمطلوبما هو هذا
zone_hintstringلاThe domain to test the zone-scoped permissions against. Optional — see `ConnectTokenRequest.zone_hint`.

الاستجابة

الاسمالنوعمطلوبما هو هذا
credential_validbooleanنعمA statement about the **credential**, not about the permissions. `false` means the provider rejected it outright, in which case the rows are not meaningful and the screen must s…
usablebooleanنعمWhether we may store and use this credential: alive, with no **proved** absence of anything required. ⛔ Deliberately not "every row passed" — a brand-new account with no zone on…
checksPermissionCheck[]نعمOne row per permission, in a stable catalogue order rather than the order the checks happened to finish in — a checklist whose rows reshuffle between two retests looks broken to…
missingstring[]نعمRequired permissions the provider **proved** are absent. Not the unknowns.
unverifiedstring[]نعمPermissions we could not determine either way. The honest amber set.
account_refstringنعمThe account or zone the provider reported — discovered, never assumed.
detailstringنعمAn overall explanation, used mainly for a rejected credential.
checked_atobjectنعمWhen this was taken. ⛔ Never render the report without it: a checklist with no date on it is indistinguishable from a live one and will be read as live, when in fact the custome…

الأخطاء التي يمكن أن تُرجعها نقطة النهاية هذه

401 · 403 · 404 · 422 · 429 · 503