hosting

PUT /v1/sites/{siteId}/wordpress/users/{wpUserId}/role

Change a WordPress account's role.

Tüm hosting uç noktaları

Kimlik Doğrulama

Bearer token olarak bir API anahtarı gönderin. Anahtar sites.view iznine sahip olmalıdır; bu izne sahip olmayan bir anahtar 404 ile değil, 403 ile reddedilir.

Bu uç nokta hiçbir organizasyon kimliği almaz. Anahtarınız zaten ait olduğu organizasyonu tanımlar ve yanıt bu organizasyonla sınırlandırılır.

Dene

Köşeli parantez içindeki her şeyi kendi değerlerinizle ve anahtar yer tutucusunu panonuzdan bir anahtarla değiştirin.

curl -X PUT https://api.zinndigital.com/v1/sites/{siteId}/wordpress/users/{wpUserId}/role \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer zdk_live_…" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{ "role": <string> }'

Oturum açtınız mı? Panonuzdaki API konsolu, gerçek organizasyon kimliğinizi ve kendi anahtarınızı otomatik olarak doldurur ve isteği canlı API üzerinde çalıştırarak gerçek yanıtı görmenizi sağlar. Bu uç noktayı API konsolunda açın

Ayrıntılar

Replaces the account's roles with exactly the one in the body — the other half of "add and remove administrators", and the half that lets a customer fix a mistake without deleting somebody's account and their authorship along with it. ⛔ **Replaces, never adds.** WordPress lets one account hold several roles at once, so granting the new role without removing the old one would leave a "demoted" administrator holding both — an account that reads as an editor on every screen and can still do everything. That outcome is indistinguishable from a successful demotion, which is why the distinction is stated here rather than left to the implementation. Its own path rather than a field on the user resource, for the same reason the password reset has one: a role change and a delete must not be two shapes of one request. **Promoting to `administrator` and demoting *from* one both** require the package's administrator-management capability, not merely `wp_users`. The promotion is obvious; the demotion matters just as much, because removing the last administrator's role locks every human out of the site as thoroughly as deleting them would. `422` for a role the install does not define, or a platform with no role field. `404` for a site with no vendor hosting package, and for an id that is not on it. Requires `sites.view` and `sites.panel_access`.

Parametreler

AdTürZorunluNe olduğu
siteId (path)UuidEvetSite ID (UUIDv7).
wpUserId (path)stringEvetThe account's WordPress id, as `listSiteWordPressUsers` reports it.

İstek gövdesi

AdTürZorunluNe olduğu
rolestringEvetThe role the account should hold, from `listSiteWordPressRoles`.

Yanıt

AdTürZorunluNe olduğu
idstringEvetThe account's WordPress id, carried as a string because it is the vendor's identifier rather than ours.
loginstringEvetThe name the account signs in with.
display_namestringEvetThe name shown on the site's posts and comments.
emailstringEvetThe account's email address. Personal data about the customer's **own** users, which is why the whole listing is gated on `sites.panel_access`.
rolesstringEvetThe account's roles, in the vendor's own spelling.
registered_atstringEvetWhen WordPress recorded the account, in the vendor's own format. Not typed as a date-time: the platform does not guarantee one, and coercing it would invent precision.
is_administratorbooleanEvetWhether the account is an administrator. ⛔ Set from **which vendor endpoint the row came from**, not guessed from the role string — the two lists sit behind two different capabi…

Bu uç noktanın dönderebileceği hatalar

401 · 403 · 404 · 409 · 422 · 429 · 503