connections

POST /v1/connections/{provider}/{connectionId}/probe

Re-test a stored credential, one row per permission.

Gbogbo àwọn connections endpoints

Ìfàṣẹ́pọ̀

Fi bọ́ọ̀lù (bearer token) ranṣẹ gẹ́gẹ́ bí kọ́kọ́rọ́ API. Kọ́kọ́rọ́ náà gbọ́dọ̀ ní ìyọ̀ǹda connections.manage; a ó kọ̀ ọ́ silẹ pẹlu 403, kii ṣe 404, ti kọ́kọ́rọ́ náà kò bá ní i.

Ojú abánisọ̀rọ̀ yìí kò gba id ajọ kankan. Kọ́kọ́rọ́ rẹ ti mọ ajọ ti o jẹ ti e, a o si fèsì nipa rẹ̀.

Gbiyanju rẹ

Rọ́pọ̀ èyíkéyìí nínú àwọn àmì ìtọ́ka < > pẹ̀lú iye tirẹ̀, àti àmì ìdánimọ̀ bọ́tìnnì náà pẹ̀lú bọ́tìnnì kan láti inú dásibọ̀ọ̀dù rẹ.

curl -X POST https://api.zinndigital.com/v1/connections/{provider}/{connectionId}/probe \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer zdk_live_…" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{  }'

Ṣé o ti wọlé? Iwọ̀n api ní nú ìgbékalẹ̀ rẹ kún id àjọ gidi rẹ ati bọtini tirẹ, o si nṣiṣẹ ibeere na lòdì si api gidi ki o le rii esi gidi na. Ṣí ojú abáná yìí sílẹ̀ nínú kọnsólù API

Àwọn kúlẹ̀kúlẹ̀

Exercises every permission we need **against the provider** using the credential already stored for this connection, and returns one row per permission. This is the "retest" half of add-and-test: the customer's fix happens in their vendor's console — they tick the missing permission at Cloudflare — so there is nothing to re-paste and the stored credential is used. ⛔ It does not ask the credential to describe itself. A least-privilege token cannot enumerate its own permissions, which is how a token missing DNS edit entirely came to be displayed as "works, we will check on first use". Every check here is a real, well-formed call, and a write permission is proved by writing — a throwaway DNS record created and immediately deleted, or a zone setting written back to the value just read. Each row is `pass`, `fail` or **`unknown`**, and the third is not a nicety: `unknown` is the honest answer when we could not reach the question — no zone on the account yet, the vendor rate-limiting us, or a well-formed request refused on its content. ⛔ A client that renders `unknown` as a tick has reintroduced the defect this endpoint exists to remove. The result is stored against the connection with the time it was taken, and returned with `checked_at`. It is a **measurement, not a state** — the customer can revoke a permission at their vendor a second later and nothing here will know — so any surface showing it must show its age. Requires `connections.manage`.

Àwọn ìpìlẹ̀

OrúkọIruTí a nílòKini o jẹ
provider (path)ConnectionProviderBẹẹniThe third-party provider whose connections are addressed.
connectionId (path)UuidBẹẹniThe MCP connection's id.

Akoonu ibeere naa

OrúkọIruTí a nílòKini o jẹ
zone_hintstringBẹẹkọThe domain to test the zone-scoped permissions against. Optional — see `ConnectTokenRequest.zone_hint`.

Idahun

OrúkọIruTí a nílòKini o jẹ
credential_validbooleanBẹẹniA statement about the **credential**, not about the permissions. `false` means the provider rejected it outright, in which case the rows are not meaningful and the screen must s…
usablebooleanBẹẹniWhether we may store and use this credential: alive, with no **proved** absence of anything required. ⛔ Deliberately not "every row passed" — a brand-new account with no zone on…
checksPermissionCheck[]BẹẹniOne row per permission, in a stable catalogue order rather than the order the checks happened to finish in — a checklist whose rows reshuffle between two retests looks broken to…
missingstring[]BẹẹniRequired permissions the provider **proved** are absent. Not the unknowns.
unverifiedstring[]BẹẹniPermissions we could not determine either way. The honest amber set.
account_refstringBẹẹniThe account or zone the provider reported — discovered, never assumed.
detailstringBẹẹniAn overall explanation, used mainly for a rejected credential.
checked_atobjectBẹẹniWhen this was taken. ⛔ Never render the report without it: a checklist with no date on it is indistinguishable from a live one and will be read as live, when in fact the custome…

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